


















CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2321 









An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 









This paper analyzes subsidies for intracity and intercity commuting in an urban economics 
framework with two cities and agglomeration externalities, where workers may commute 
within and between cities. First, commuting subsidies serve to internalize agglomeration 
externalities: Intracity commuting subsidies give incentives to move to the larger city and 
intercity commuting subsidies make residents of the periphery commute to the core. Second, 
if agglomeration rents are locally captured, commuting subsidies act as a welfare enhancing 
transfer from the core to the periphery. 
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May 21, 2008 1 Introduction
We study the role of commuting subsidies to achieve an ecient spatial allocation in an
urban model with agglomeration externalities and long-distance as well as short-distance
commuting. The analysis is motivated by theoretical and practical concerns. On the policy
side, we note that commuting subsidies are widespread. For instance, studies nd that in
the US less than one third of the total costs of public transit is covered by fares, while user
fees account for only 60% of total expenditures on highways.1 An interesting observation
comes from a recent reform in Germany: the tax code was recently changed by eliminating
deductibility of commuting distances of less than 20 km. For larger distances, deductibility
remains. In general, the widespread subsidization of commuting provokes the question of
why these subsidies are paid, and why subsidy rates should vary with distance.
One possible explanation rests on politics: for instance, Borck and Wrede [6, 7] show
how subsidies redistribute between rich and poor city dwellers and between renters and
landowners.
Another explanation would be to look for eciency reasons. Here, the literature has
been somewhat divided. Brueckner [8], for instance, shows that in a standard urban model,
commutings subsidies are inecient because they distort land use. However, given the
absence of externalities, this is not surprising. Hence, arguments for commuting subsidies
rest either on pre-existing distortions, for instance, a distortive income tax (see Wrede
[14, 15]) or on externalities. For example, in an eciency wage model, Zenou [16] shows
that commuting subsidies may be benecial by reducing unemployment. Martin [11] shows
that commuting subsidies can correct ineciencies from spatial mismatch (the problem
that minority workers live far from jobs and therefore have higher unemployment rates
and lower welfare), but the welfare gains are generally small compared to rst best policies
(which would eliminate the reasons leading to mismatch, such as discrimination in the
housing market).
Arnott [2] studies congestion tolling in a model with trac congestion and agglomera-
tion eects.2 His model diers from ours in that it considers only one city (which has no
1See Borck [4] for more discussion and references.
2See also Verhoef and Nijkamp [13] for a very similar approach. They study the internalization of conges-
1explicit spatial dimension, rather commuting occurs between \islands") and he focusses on
the trade-o between the internalization of congestion and agglomeration externalities. In
contrast to Arnott [2], we focus on the optimal allocation of workers and residences across
cities.
On the theoretical side, our paper also contributes to the literature by analyzing long-
distance commuting between cities as well as short-distance commuting within cities.3
This seems to be relevant since, given agglomeration eects, the decisions to commute
to employment center 1 or to employment center 2 obviously have dierent allocative
eects. Therefore, we explicitly introduce these two margins of choice in a model which
combines an Alonso-Muth-Mills urban model with agglomeration eects  a la Henderson
[10]. Agglomeration eects generally imply that social and private returns to working in a
city do not coincide, and we show that dierentiated subsidies to long- and short-distance
commuting may achieve rst-best eciency. That is, our analysis can be viewed as a
possible normative justication of why commuting should be subsidized and why long-
distance commuting between cities and short-distance commuting within cities should be
treated dierently. The basic reason for subsidizing commuting is that workers do not
receive their full marginal social product. Therefore, commuting subsidies help to ensure
that workers commute to that employment center which yields the highest social output.
Beyond that, however, (short-distance) commuting subsidies also serve to make workers
choose the right place of residence.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the model. In Section 3,
we study the social planner problem how to allocate the population between two cities,
where the choice variables relate to the resident and working populations. In Section 4,
we focus on the market equilibrium, which is achieved by individuals choosing their place
of residence and workplace. Section 5 discusses the choice of policy instruments, and the
last section concludes.
tion and agglomeration externalities through congestion tolling and wage subsidies in a single monocentric
city.
3Borck et al. [5] also study long-distance commuting but do not model the spatial extension of cities
and hence ignore commuting within cities.
22 The model
We consider an economy with two cities, labeled 1 and 2. There is a total of N mobile
workers. Workers simultaneously choose their place of residence and their place of work.
That is, by commuting costlessly from one city to the other, workers may separate job and
residence.
Workers confer Marshallian urbanization externalities upon each other, that is, a worker
is more productive the larger the number of other workers in the city, perhaps because of
knowledge spillovers (see Duranton and Puga [9] for the microfoundations of agglomeration
economies). This is captured in a simplistic way by assuming that the wage rate earned by
a worker working in city i, wi, is a function of the local labor force, Hi.4 Suppose that the
production function of rm j in city i is yji = E(Hi)F(hji;lji), where hji is labor employed
by rm j, Hi aggregate labor in the city, and lji is an immobile input employed by rm j
in city i. The immobile input could be either buildings or publicly provided infrastructure.
Without loss of generality, we assume that city 1 is endowed with a stock of the immobile
input at least as large as that in city 2: L1  L2, where Li is the aggregate amount of
the immobile input in city i. F(hji;) is a linearly homogeneous function with F(0;) = 0,
positive but decreasing marginal products for both factors. The function E(Hi), with
E(0)  0 and E0(Hi) > 0, captures the positive agglomeration externality. When F()
fullls the Inada-condition, limHi!0 FH(Hi;) = 1, the \internal" marginal product of
labor goes to innity if the number of workers goes to zero. Together with E() > 0, the
Inada condition precludes full agglomeration of labor (see Michel et al. [12]).
Firms are assumed to maximize prots under perfect competition. Each rm takes
aggregate labor in the city as given. Thus, even though there are increasing returns at the
city level, each rm views itself as facing constant returns. Hence, workers are paid their
marginal product, and the wage of a worker working in city i is
wi = E(Hi)FH(Hi;Li); (1)
where Hi is the local labor force and prots are zero.
4This approach follows among others Henderson [10], Abdel-Rahman and Anas [1] and Michel et al.
[12].
3Each city is linear and extends from zero to ri;i = 1;2, where the boundary ri is
endogenously determined by individuals' residence choices. All workers working in a city
commute to the central business district (CBD) to work; all those working in the other city
rst commute to the CBD and then from there to the other city. A natural way to think
of this assumption is workers commuting by train, where the train stations are located
in the city centers. Hence, regardless of where a worker works, if she lives at r km from
the CBD, she incurs commuting costs of twr where w is the wage and t > 0 the inverse
of travel speed (commuting costs are in terms of time). A worker who commutes long
distance additionally incurs a cost of kw, with k > 0; to commute from CBD to CBD.
An individual living at r km from the CBD where she works supplies 1   tr units of
labor. If she lives r km from CBD i and commutes to CBD j, she supplies 1 k  tr units
of labor. We will assume that 1   tN   k > 0. This implies that even if everyone were
to live in, say, city 2, then if the outermost resident commutes to city 1 they would still
supply a positive amount of labor there (i.e. commuting does not take the entire workday).
The number of inhabitants of city i working in the same city is denoted by Ni, the
number of commuters from 2 to 1 by M21. Without loss of generality, the focus is on
long-distance commuting from CBD 2 to CBD 1, i.e. M21  0. Note that transport costs,
together with homogeneity of workers, exclude two-way commuting.
We assume a regional government that aims to maximize the joint welfare of citizens.
Thus, competition among local governments for mobile workers is absent.5 The government
may subsidize commuting at rate ss within cities and at rate sl across cities. Short distance
commuters in city i receive sswitr, long-distance commuters from 2 to 1 receive ssw1tr +
slw1k. These subsidies may come in the form of subsidized public transport, tolls or
other transport fees below total costs, or income tax deductions for commuting expenses.
Subsidies are nanced by a lump-sum tax T on all citizens. In order to obtain reasonable
5Introducing such competition may obviously be an interesting extension of our model. However, we
note that in many countries, while city governments have some discretion over transport policies, many
instruments such as income tax policies or large infrastructure policies tend to be under the control of
regional or even national governments. Hence, our assumption seems to be a reasonable approximation of
reality. Also, competition of governments would introduce another distortion, but we want to focus here
on one distortion only and how to deal with it.
4rent schedules, we assume throughout the analysis that short distance subsidies do not
exceed costs. Hence, we assume ss  1.
All workers live on plots of land of xed size which is normalized to unity. Land rent
at distance r will be denoted by p(r). We assume that utility, v, equals consumption, c.
Given that plot size is xed, this assumption is innocuous.
We assume that economic rents, namely land rents and the income of the immobile, are
equally distributed among all citizens living in the respective city. Aggregate land rent in
city i is denoted by Ri, and immobile input income in city i is denoted by Qi. Per capita








Since our assumption on the distribution of rents aects the results regarding the necessity
of subsidies, in Section 5 we also consider economic rents which are distributed equally
among all workers.
Suppose rst that nobody commutes from the city under consideration to the other
city. Then utility for a worker living in city i is given by
vi = ci = wi[1   (1   ss)tr]   pi(r) + Ii   T; (3)
which is simply the wage net of commuting costs, minus housing rents, plus economic
rents minus tax. Solving (3) for land rent as a function of commuting distance denes an
individual's bid rent function:
pi(r) = wi[1   (1   ss)tr] + Ii   T   ci: (4)
As usual, we assume that competition for land implies that the highest bidder lives on any
plot. Thus, which of two individuals lives closer to the CBD will depend on the slope of
the bid rent function
@pi(r)
@r
=  (1   ss)wit:
In particular, since commuting is time consuming, individuals with higher wages live closer
to the CBD.6
6Of course, this assumption depends on equal housing consumption for all individuals. Otherwise, the
slope of the bid rent function is given by the ratio of the net wage to housing consumption.
5At the city border, land rent must equal the agricultural land rent, which is normalized
zero. Since ri = Ni, we can solve pi(Ni) = 0, from (4) to nd an expression for utility:
ci = wi[1   (1   ss)tNi] + Ii   T: (5)
Substituting back into (4) and using the denition of aggregate land rent, Ri =
R Ni
0 pi(r)dr,
this can be further reduced to
ci = wi









Using the same procedure, we nd the utility of residents in city 2 when all commute
to city 1 by substituting M21 for Ni and taking account of long-distance commuting costs:
c21 = w1









Residents of city 2 will only commute to CBD 1 if their wage net of commuting costs
is higher in city 1 than in city 2, i.e. if
w1[1   (1   sl)k   (1   ss)tr] > w2[1   (1   ss)tr]: (8)
Provided that w1 > w2 it can easily be shown that there is a critical distance ~ r such that all
residents living at distance r > ~ r work in CBD 2 and all residents living at r  ~ r commute
to CBD 1, where
~ r =
(1   (1   sl)k)w1   w2
(1   ss)t(w1   w2)
:
Note that if some individuals commute from city 2 to city 1, the commuters will live
closer to the CBD of city 2 if they have higher bid rents for locations close to the CBD.
Hence, if the wage in city 1 is higher than the wage in city 2, long-distance commuters will
tend to have steeper bid rents and will, therefore, prefer to live close to the CBD.





w1[1   (1   sl)k   (1   ss)tr]   c21 + I2   T for r < ~ r
w2[1   (1   ss)tr]   c2 + I2   T otherwise
: (9)




























 c2N2   c21M21 + (I2   T)(N2 + M21)
There is then a kink of the land-rent schedule at the distance ~ r = M21 where a city 2
resident is just indierent between commuting to city 1 or working in city 2. At this kink,
we have
w1[1   (1   sl)k   (1   ss)tM21]   c21 = w2[1   (1   ss)tM21]   c2: (11)
At the urban fringe in city 2, r2 = N   N1, utility is
c2 = w2[1   (1   ss)t(N   N1)] + I2   T: (12)
















































Residents of city 1, workers of city 2, and workers of city 1 living in city 2 receive subsidies.




(1   tr)dr +
Z M21
0
























In city 1, each resident and each commuter from city 2 supplies one unit of time minus
commuting time. In city 2, labor is only supplied by a fraction of residents. Here, we
assume that subsidies increase income, but do not directly reduce travel time.
7Since our main concern here is with eciency, we will assume that a regional government collects
revenue from both cities and uses this to nance eciency enhancing subsidies.
73 Optimum allocation of workers
We now characterize the socially optimal allocation of workers across communities, both
in terms of residences, and in terms of employment. Due to our assumptions, the welfare
maximum simply maximizes total output: population is homogeneous, the lot size is xed,
leisure is not explicitly modeled, and non-time costs of commuting are neglected. Hence,




Y = G(H1;L1) + G(H2;L2) (16)
s.t. N1 + N2 + M21 = N; N2  0;M21  0; (14); and (15):



























+ (N   N1   N2   M21) + 1N2 + 2M21;
and the corresponding rst order conditions are
GH(H1;L1)(1   tN1)    = 0; (17)
GH(H2;L2)(1   t(N2 + M21)    + 1 = 0; (18)
GH(H1;L1)(1   k   tM21)   GH(H2;L2)tN2    + 2 = 0: (19)
Due to the non-convexity of the optimization problem, local maxima may not be global
maxima. However, some characteristics of optima can be obtained by analyzing the rst
order conditions.
Case 1: N2 = M21 = 0: This would imply full agglomeration of population (N1 = N).
The complementary slackness conditions are 1;2  0. Examining (17){(19) shows that
this implies
GH(0;L2)   GH (N(1   tN=2);L1)(1   tN)  0
GH (N(1   tN=2);L1)(tN   k)  0:
Since GH = E(H)FH(H;L) + E0(H)F(H;L), we have:
8Proposition 1 Full agglomeration of population, N1 = N, can be socially optimal if
and only if k  tN and either (i) E(0) > 0 and the Inada condition does not hold
(limHi!0 FH(Hi;) is nite) or (ii) E(0) = 0.
Thus, full agglomeration of population cannot be optimal only if long-distance com-
muting is suciently cheap, in particular, if commuting from CBD to CBD costs less than
commuting within a city would if all workers were to live there. Further, if the Inada con-
ditions hold, full agglomeration of population cannot be optimal, since then the marginal
product of shifting one worker from city 1 to city 2 must be positive.
Case 2: N2 = 0;M21 > 0: We now have 1  0;2 = 0. Combining (17){(19) gives
GH(0;L2)(1   t(N   N1))   GH(H1;L1)(1   k   t(N   N1))  0
GH(H1;L1)(t(2N1   N)   k) = 0:
Thus, we have the following result:
Proposition 2 Full agglomeration of employment, N2 = 0, can be socially optimal only
if (i) E(0) > 0 and the Inada condition does not hold (limHi!0 FH(Hi;) is nite) or (ii)
E(0) = 0. Furthermore, if E(0) > 0 and the Inada condition holds (limHi!0 FH(Hi;) =










Case 3: N2 > 0;M21 = 0: We now have 1 = 0;2  0. From (17){(19) we nd
GH(H1;L1)(1   k)   GH(H2;L2)  0; (20)
GH(H1;L1)(1   tN1)   GH(H2;L2)(1   t(N   N1)) = 0: (21)
This shows that long-distance commuting is probably inecient if it is very time con-
suming and if the dierences in the stocks of immobile inputs are not too large. If L1 = L2,
a symmetric allocation without long-distance commuting, i.e. N1 = N2 = N=2, possibly
maximizes output. Indeed, as can readily be seen from (21), this will be the case if the
production function is concave, i.e., GHH < 0. If L1 > L2, an asymmetric allocation with
N1 > N2 > 0 and M21 = 0 may also be an optimum.
9Case 4: N2 > 0;M21 > 0: We now have 1;2 > 0. Combining (17){(19) gives
GH(H1;L1)[1   k   t(N   N1   N2)] = GH(H2;L2)[1   t(N   N1   N2)]; (22)
GH(H1;L1)(1   tN1) = GH(H2;L2)[1   t(N   N1)]: (23)
According to the second condition, the social marginal product of labor should be equalized
for the outermost residents. The rst condition requires that at distance M21 in city 2
opting for long-distance commuting should neither increase nor decrease output.
These conditions imply
N2 =
[1   t(N   N1)][k + t(N   2N1)]
(2N1   N)t2 : (24)
Since we have assumed 1 > k + tN and since the optimum with long-distance commuting
requires N1 > N=2 and N2 > 0, we conclude that N1 < N=2 + k=(2t) holds.
An asymmetric interior allocation, where N1;N2; and M21 are all greater than zero, may
also be optimal. From closer inspection of the problem it becomes immediately clear that an
asymmetric allocation with long-distance commuting is only optimal when agglomeration
externalities are suciently strong and long-distance commuting costs k are suciently
low. Otherwise, a less asymmetric allocation without long-distance commuting maximizes
output. Moreover, (22) directly implies GH(H1;L1) > GH(H2;L2), i.e. that workers
commute to the CBD with the higher social marginal product of labor. Since working
hours in CBD 1 are more valuable than in CBD 2, eciency requires that in city 2 long-
distance commuters live closer to the CBD than short-distance commuters. Furthermore,
as an implication of (22), M21 + N2 < N=2 < N1. Long-distance commuting to CBD 1
is only optimal if already more than half the population lives in city 1. Moreover, a very
large dierence between input endowments, L1  L2 also makes this type of optimum
more likely. Finally, as already been stated, N2 > 0.
4 Migration equilibria and subsidies
We now study market equilibria, where individuals can freely migrate and commute, that
is, they choose their place of residence and their place of work based on the utility obtained
10when living and working in city 1 versus living and working in city 2 or living in city 2 and
working in 1.
Let us then look at the choice of residence and workplace. As is usual in the new
economic geography literature, we assume a myopic adjustment process. That is, the
change in population and in workforce is governed by the ad-hoc dynamics
_ N1 = (c1   c2)N1(N   N1); (25)
_ M21 = (c21   c2)M21(N   N1); (26)
where the dot indicates derivatives with respect to time. Then, we nd interior equilibria
with N1 < N;0 < M21 < N   N1 if
c1(N1;M21) = c2(N1;M21) = c21(N1;M21); (27)
where ci(N1;M21);i = 1;2 and c21(N1;M21) are given by (6) and (7) in combination with
the government budget constraint, (13). By contrast, we get corner solutions with full
agglomeration of population if c1(N;)  c2(N;). Likewise, there would be no long-
distance commuting if c21(N1;0)  c2(N1;0) while all city 2 residents would commute to
city 1 if c21(N1;N   N1)  c2(N1;N   N1).8
Provided that L1 = L2, the symmetric allocation N1 = N2 = N=2 is obviously an
equilibrium regardless of the size of subsidies, since utility is the same in both cities and
due to equal wages no one can gain from long-distance commuting.
From (27), an equilibrium with long-distance commuting where N1;N2;M21 > 0 is
characterized by
w1[1   (1   sl)k   (1   ss)t(N   N1   N2)] = w2[1   (1   ss)t(N   N1   N2)]; (28)
w1[1   (1   ss)tN1] + I1 = w2[1   (1   ss)t(N   N1)] + I2; (29)
where we have used M21 = N  N1 N2. The rst condition ensures that at the kink of the
land-rent schedule in city 2, residents are indierent between long-distance commuting and
working in the city of residence. The second condition equalizes utility of the outermost
residents in both cities.
8The last two conditions are obviously equivalent to ~ r  0 and ~ r  N   N1.
















which is equal to net aggregate commuting costs within city 2 (see [3]).
In city 2, long-distance commuters only live closer to the CBD than short-distance
commuters { as required by eciency { if w1[1   (1   sl)k] > w2 and w1 > w2. The
former condition implies that at the CBD 2 long-distance commuters are willing to pay
more for land than CBD-2 workers, the second condition ensures that the bid-rent curve
of the former group is steeper than that of the latter group.
By comparison of the rst-order conditions of the social optimum and the market
equilibrium conditions, i.e., on the one hand, (22) and (28), and, on the other hand, (23)
and (29), it becomes clear that an interior migration equilibrium with N1;N2;M21 > 0
would in general not be spatially ecient with zero commuting subsidies. The reason is
simply that due to agglomeration externalities workers do not accrue the full marginal
benet from moving residence and/or workplace to the core: Wages are not equal to
the marginal social product of labor and commuters from the periphery to the core do not
participate in economic rents earned in the core. By subsidizing commuting, internalization
becomes possible. While short-distance commuting subsidies reduce the costs of living in
the larger city, i.e., the core, long-distance commuting subsidies enhance the benets of
commuting from the periphery to the core. Indeed, it can be shown that subsidies may
lead to rst-best eciency. We can solve (22), (23), (28), and (29) implicitly for the rst-
best subsidies s
s and s
l (the equations for s
l and s
s are somewhat cumbersome and are,
therefore, omitted):
Proposition 3 If spatial eciency requires N1;N2;M21 > 0 and E(H1)FH(H1;L1) >
E(H2)FH(H2;L2), the ecient allocation can be supported by a combination of short-




Numerical example. We now present a numerical example which shows what the opti-
mal allocation is, depending on the parameters of the model, and how this can be supported
















Figure 1: Stability of residence choice and commuting






with 0 <  < 1, and an externality function
E(Hi) = (H + c)
;
where c  0 and 0 < . For parameters N = 5, k = 0:1, t = 0:08, c = 0,  = 0:3,
 = 0:5, L1 = 2, and L2 = 1, the optimum is N1 = 3:0628, N2 = 1:1685, and M21 = 0:7688
(case 4). The core's wage exceeds the periphery's wage: w1 = 0:5550 > 0:4959 = w2.
A subsidy for long-distance commuting at rate sl = 0:8009 together with a tax on inner-
city commuting at rate ss =  12:2228 restores the optimum as a migration equilibrium.
While the long-distance commuting subsidy encourages commuting, the short-distance
commuting tax discourages living in the core. This is necessary, since the aggregate land
rent and the immobile input's income is much higher in the core than in the periphery:
I1 = 1:50727 > 0:784398 = I2. Local asymptotic stability of the equilibrium is also an issue.
Calculating the trace and the determinant of the system dened by (25) and (26), stability
can be veried. For this numerical example, it can be easily shown that the dierence in
consumption of resident workers in both cities, c1  c2, declines as N1 increases. The same
holds true around the equilibrium for the dierence in consumption of commuters and local
workers in city 2, namely c21   c2, as M21 increases (see gure 1).
If, everything else equal, we set  = 0:6, the production function exhibits increasing
aggregate returns to scale. Now, a corner solution where production is concentrated at
13the larger center 1 maximizes welfare (case 2), namely N1 = 3:125, N2 = 0, and M21 =
1:875. Taxing inner-city commuting at ss =  11:1131 and heavily subsidizing long-distance
commuting at sl = 8:64355 supports this optimum.
Furthermore, if k is very large, for example k = 0:8, long distance commuting is inef-
cient. With increasing returns to scale ( = 0:6), the optimum is N1 = N which does
not require any subsidy (case 1). With decreasing returns to scale ( = 0:3), the optimum
is N1 = 3:4846, N2 = 1:51542 and M21 = 0 (case 3). A short-distance commuting tax
ss =  2 supports this optimum.
In summary, the example shows that with increasing internal returns we nd full ag-
glomeration of production, while decreasing returns lead to an interior optimum. We also
nd that long-distance commuting is part of the optimum unless commuting costs are
exceedingly large. Furthermore, the example shows that commuting subsidies may sup-
port the optimal allocation as a decentralized equilibrium, where in general, short-distance
commuting is taxed and long-distance commuting subsidized.
5 Further policy instruments
There re a couple of features of the model which generally preclude the attainment of
socially ecient equilibria: rst, that workers' wages do not compensate them for the
agglomeration externalities they generate, and second, that rents accrue only to city res-
idents. Consider the rst point: the fact that that workers are not paid their marginal
social product. An obvious corrective policy would be to subsidize wages. Indeed, location
specic wage subsidies are an alternative instrument which may be used to achieve the
rst best outcome. We do not elaborate on this point here, but note that wage subsidies
would obviously have to be dierentiated by residence, which in many countries may be
deemed unconstitutional.
Another possibility would be to dierentiate short-distance subsidies between cities.
However, as we have seen in the previous section, this does not seem necessary to achieve
eciency.
Here, we focus instead on the second point, namely, the distribution of rents. So far,
we have assumed that rents are distributed within each city to city residents. This seems
14to be standard in the literature (see e.g., Abdel-Rahman and Anas [1]). If, in contrast,
rents are equally distributed across the entire metropolitan area, commuting subsidies no
longer redistribute rents, but only correct the agglomeration externality with respect to
long-distance commuting. Note that this assumes that the regional government can collect
land rents (e.g. by taxing land rent) and immobile factor incomes and redistribute them
equally to all residents of either city in the region.
Rents per capita are now I = (R1 + R2 + Q1 + Q2)=N and the equilibrium condition
(29) becomes
w1[1   (1   ss)tN1] = w2[1   (1   ss)t(N   N1)]: (31)
Thus, the major dierence to the case of locally captured rents is that now rents play no
role for the residence decision, since individuals earn the same share of rents regardless of
their residence. Diering rents can, therefore, no longer inuence the residence decision.
A comparison of, on the one hand, (22) and (28), and, on the other hand, (23) and
(31), shows that the equilibrium conditions with zero subsidies ss = sl = 0 would coincide



















where the left-hand side is the ratio of social marginal products of labor at the optimum,
GH(H
1;L1)=GH(H
2;L2), and the right-hand side is the ratio of internal marginal products
of labor, i.e., the wage ratio. The same holds true for type 1 and type 2 optima and the
respective equilibria.
A natural question is whether or not feasible production functions exist which al-
ways satisfy (32). Consider for example the Cobb-Douglas \internal" production func-
tion F(Hi;Li) = H
i L
1 
i , with 0 <  < 1. If E(Hi) = H

i , an asymmetric equilibrium
without subsidy would satisfy the necessary conditions of spatial eciency. However, this
implies E(0) = 0. Indeed, in order to fulll (32) automatically, E0(H)F(H;L) has to be
strictly proportional to FH(H;L)E(H). A necessary (but not sucient) condition for this
is E(0) = 0. For instance, while E(H) = H fullls the condition, log(1 + H) does not.
Whether or not commuting subsidies could be used to correct a market failure if it
occurs, is not a priori clear. From (22), (28), (23), and (31) candidates for optimum
subsidies s
s and s
l can again be calculated. The following proposition summarizes this:
15Proposition 4 If the production function is such that (32) holds, an ecient allocation
can be sustained as a market equilibrium without subsidies. Otherwise, a combination of
long-distance commuting subsidies and short-distance commuting subsidies can support the
spatially ecient allocation, where, again, in general s
l 6= s
s.
While short-distance commuting subsidies have a direct impact on residence choices [see
(31)], long-distance commuting subsidies are targeted at the commuting decision. If short-
distance commuting were not subsidized, i.e. if s







1)t] = 0 would hold and, therefore, long-distance-commuting
subsidies should be zero, too. Thus, either all commuters or no one is to be subsidized.
Numerical example In order to further analyze subsidies without local rent capture,
we exploit the numerical example from the previous section. We focus on interior social
optima. Clearly, if all parameters are the same, subsidies are superuous with an equal rent
distribution, since with c = 0, E0(H)F(H;L) is strictly proportional to FH(H;L)E(H).
With c = 0:2, positive subsidies are necessary to achieve an ecient allocation of labor in a
free migration equilibrium. The optimum is N1 = 3:0639, N2 = 1:1443, and M21 = 0:7917.
Still, the core's workers earn more than the periphery's workers: w1 = 0:5640 > 0:52557 =
w2. The optimum subsidy rates are ss = 0:3234 and sl = 0:3473. Again, long-distance
subsidies exceed short-distance subsidies.
In contrast to the previous section, subsidies don't have to oset local rent dierences.
Hence, to compensate for large commuting distances within the city, residents in the larger
city also receive a positive (short-distance) subsidy.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has analyzed subsidies for intracity and intercity commuting when agglomer-
ation externalities are present. In order to analyze commuting within cities and between
cities, the monocentric city framework was extended to a two-city model where workers
choose where to live and where to work. In contrast to Abdel-Rahman and Anas [1] and
many others, we have explicitly allowed for partial agglomeration of employment instead
16of full agglomeration. We have shown that commuting subsidies can help internalize ex-
ternalities: Intracity commuting subsidies give incentives to move to the larger city and
intercity commuting subsidies make residents of the periphery commute to the core. Com-
muting subsidies act as a welfare enhancing transfer from the core to the periphery. Note
also that our analysis gives a rationale for diering treatment of short- and long-distance
commuting, a policy that can be observed in some countries. One reason for this treatment
may be that this way, government can redistribute rents from those working in the core to
those working in the periphery.
There are several directions for further research. First, we have assumed that subsidies
reduce monetary commuting costs but do not directly aect the time costs of commuting.
It seems to be worthwhile to analyze the provision of trac infrastructure which would
directly reduce travel time and thus increase labor supply. Balancing speed improvement
and infrastructure costs, the government would have a further incentive to subsidize com-
muting. Second, we have not considered locally nanced commuting subsidies and have,
therefore, excluded subsidy competition from our analysis. However, this choice seems
natural if one wants { as we did { to focus on eciency. Subsidy competition would bring
about a further source of ineciency, which is however, related to the organization of
jurisdictions and not to the existence of correct instruments.
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